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Human genetic research databases cast a new light on the controversial issue of which 
uses of the human body are morally permissible. More specifically, banking human 
tissue raises issues relating to the ownership of the samples that the participants have 
donated, to the ownership of the data that are derived through processing the donated 
samples, and to the management arrangements that better balance the interest of 
genetic research with the protection of participants’ rights. Winickoff & Winickoff 
suggest that the charitable-trust model is a superior legal arrangement for biobanking 
compared with private biobanking. This paper critically assesses Winickoff & 
Winickoff’s claim by highlighting some areas of implementation where such a model 
could be problematic. The charitable trust is certainly an advantageous arrangement 
because (1) it favors the separation between control and use of the samples, (2) it 
provides a procedural mechanism that facilitates the participation donor groups in the 
biobank management and (3) it mediates the different interests that are affected. On 
the other hand, the charitable-trust model leaves unresolved several issues—among 
them the ownership of the sample, the right of withdrawal, access and funding 
mechanism. I conclude that further theoretical and empirical analysis is required in the 
area. 
 
1 The Challenges of Genomic Biobanking 
 
Large collections of human tissues cast a new light on the controversial issue of which 
uses of the human body are morally permissible.  The technical possibilities of 
automatized data analysis of large collections of DNA samples and their 
bioinformatics processing have developed dramatically over the last few years and are 
constantly being improved. The protection of genetic data that is collected in human 
genetic research databases has consequently emerged as a highly complex ethical 
issue that urgently needs to be addressed.  In its summary of the most pressing issues 
raised by advances in genetic research, the 2002 Report of WHO’s Advisory 
Committee on Health Research on Genomics and World Health points out that  “[t]he 
planned development of large-scale genetic . . . databases offers a series of hazards 
and ethical issues which have not been encountered before”,  and it then outlines, as 
possible hazards, the “many ambiguities regarding access and control . . . the potential 
harm to individuals, groups and communities . . . risks . . . arising from access to 
genetic information, both by individuals themselves and by third parties.” 1  
Furthermore, the Report lists access by “health insurance companies, government 
bodies, or the legal profession and police” as well as “the effect of stigmatizing entire 
countries or particular groups of individuals, and there are concerns about commercial 
exploitation without adequate compensation” as pressing ethical issues.2  Ethical 
issues become even more acute when genetic data are combined with information on 
individuals’ health, lifestyle or genealogy. Furthermore, human genetic research 
databases raise specific issues of ownership of samples that the participants have 
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donated, ownership of the data that are derived through processing the donated 
samples, and of management arrangements that better balance the interest of genetic 
research with the protection of participants’ rights.  
 
In recent years, per-profit companies have been increasingly involved in genetic 
research and in the creation of large genetic databases.  However, commercial 
biobanking has raised even more substantial questions about the conditions under 
which genetic databases can be established, kept, and made use of in an ethically 
acceptable way.  To address some of the growing concerns, scholars have proposed 
arrangements that are alternative to commercial biobanking.  In a 2003 paper, David 
and Richard Winickoff proposed the charitable trust as a model for genomic biobanks 
superior to commercial biobanking.3  This paper critically analyzes Winickoff & 
Winickoff’s article, concluding that the charitable trust model in itself does not solve 
many of the open questions. My basic argument is that the charitable trust model 
provides an interesting governance model, but many of the issues can only be solved 
at level of rules that are governing the trust rather than in the model itself.  The 
following sections lay out my critique of Winickoff & Winickoff first by describing 
their proposal (Section 2) and then by critically assessing and illustrating the critical 
aspects of their proposal (Section 3).  Finally, I present my conclusion and provide 
some indication for further policy research of biobanks (Section 4). 
 
2 The Charitable Trust Model 
 
A biobank organized as a charitable trust would be created by a trust agreement under 
which the participant in the research project (or settler), “formally expresses a wish to 
transfer his or her property interest in the tissue to the trust.”4  By donating the tissue 
samples to the biobank, the donor contextually appoints the recipient as trustee of the 
property, who has legal fiduciary duties to keep or use the property for the benefit of 
the beneficiary.  Winickoff & Winickoff suggest that in genetic biobanking the 
general public acts as the beneficiary of the charitable trust.5
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To provide a more viable arrangement, the authors add a few features to the model.  
First, the trust shall collect samples only if each donor gives “permission” to collect 
and store the sample.  The authors are thus avoiding the traps of the informed consent 
terminology by using the terminology that was first proposed by Henry Greely.  In 
fact, talking about informed consent would be inappropriate in genomic biobanking, 
Professor Greely argues.  When dealing with large collections of biological samples, 
participants are not asked to consent to a particular research protocol with specific 
risks and benefits.  In fact, all the uses that investigators will make of the samples are 
often not foreseeable at the time of the collection. Their samples are therefore more 
likely becoming part of a research resource, usable for many different protocols, 
concerning many different medical conditions.  “Without knowing what research will 
be done, one can only speculate on the risks and benefits. For this reason, it might be 
better in this context to talk about ‘permission’ for research uses of patient data.”6
 
Second, an institutional review board (IRB) shall approve any subsequent research.  
Therefore, although the donors have given permission to an open list of researchers, 
the collected samples can only by used in new research if the IRB approves it.  Third, 
participants should be granted an absolute right of withdrawal.  Whenever 
settlers/donors are no longer interested in being part of the biobank, they should be 
able to withdraw their permission, and to prevent the biobank from using the samples 
in future research studies.  Furthermore, permission for future research projects would 
not be required providing that participants are periodically updated on the different 
protocols that have been approved, and that they retain a right of opting-out whenever 
dissatisfied with the medical research that is carried out.  Finally, Winickoff & 
Winickoff envisage other features as essential components of a biobank:  the full 
disclosure of commercial arrangements and the protection of the participants’ 
confidentiality by encrypting all identifying information. 
 
Winickoff & Winickoff argue that the charitable trust presents three clear advantages, 
namely the protection of the participants’ rights, the propensity to build participants’ 
trust, and the protection and maximization of the scientific value of the biological 
collection.  I shall briefly discuss these arguments.  First, the charitable trust protects 
the rights of the participants in at least two ways:  a) the trusted collection shall serve 
exclusively the interests of the beneficiary – the “general public” –, and the 
participants are within the general public; b) by having a donors committee and a 
group or population committee, the interests of the participants are directly taken into 
consideration in managing the collection.  Second, by not being geared toward the 
maximization of profits but rather toward the maximization of the utility for the 
beneficiary of the trust, the charitable trust engages in a trust-building relationship 
with the potential participants.  Third, by serving the “general public,” the scientific 
value of the collected samples is maximized.  On the other hand, a commercial 
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3 Assessing the charitable trust model 
 
In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the charitable trust model, I shall 
begin by outlining the advantages that, in my opinion, the model presents.  I will then 
discuss my perplexities of the Winickoff & Winickoff’s proposal. 
 
3.1 Three advantages of the charitable trust model 
 
The charitable trust model presents at least three advantages if compared to a model 
based purely on contractual relationships.  First, the charitable trust model favors the 
separation between control and use of the collected samples.  Large collections of 
human tissue are often being developed as resources that enable future research 
projects rather than as tools to enhance pre-existing genetic investigations. Therefore, 
who stores samples and data is often not the user of the same because he/she is not 
carrying out genetic research directly. In other words, in the real world storage of 
material and use of the same are often separate, and having an institutional 
framework—such as the charitable trust model—that builds upon this distinction is a 
clear advantage. 
 
This dichotomy also (1) reduces the possibilities of conflict of interest between having 
custody of samples and using them especially in making prioritization decisions, (2) 
enhances the possibility to perform ethics review of the genetic research, and (3) 
favors the participation of different interest groups in deciding the fate of stored 
tissue.  First, who manages a collection of human material in the public interest faces 
prioritization decisions regarding the use of the samples—who should access the 
database? For what purposes? In which country? Under which conditions? Therefore, 
if the manager of the collection is himself/herself one of the potential users of the 
material, he/she faces a constant conflict of interest in making decisions about the use 
of the collection. In fact, he/she may be inclined to favor a project where he/she has a 
personal stake over one where he/she has no bearing, without focusing exclusively on 
the public interest—that’s human nature. By having an institutional framework based 
on the separation between storage and use, the conflict of interest in making 
prioritization decisions would certainly be reduced. 
 
First, as a practical matter, transparency and opportunity for ethics review are 
enhanced if storage and use are separate.  In this scenario, third-party researchers 
interested in accessing the samples would always be required to file a request to 
access the samples—or the genetic data that are derived from the samples.  By filing 
such requests, external researchers would make explicit the circumstances and the 
intended purpose of their access.  This practice would certainly favor a transparent 
access to databases and accountability of the both the third parties towards the trustees 
and of the trustees towards the “general public.” 
 
Second, the charitable trust model provides a governance framework that facilitates 
the participation of donor groups in the management of the database.  In fact, 
procedural mechanisms are built in the model so that one or more committees that 
represent the donor group, or other groups that have an interest in the management of 
the database, must be established. In the end, this requirement favors participation in 
the management of the biobank, its transparency, and eventually societal trust. 
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Third, the charitable trust model facilitates balancing the different interests that are 
affected in large-scale DNA collections.  The trusted biological samples can only by 
used to serve the interest of the beneficiary.  Thus, each request for access shall be 
balanced against the interest of the “general public”.  However, the “general public” 
can be construed as a complex entity.  As the French Comité Consultatif National 
d'Ethique pour les sciences de la vie et de la santé points out, the “curator [of a 
database] is at the center of a network of rights and obligations that need to be 
managed.”7  It is certainly wider than the totality of the participants and it probably 
includes all the different communities that are affected by the genetic research that is 
conducted by using the database.  However, the charitable trust presents the advantage 
of establishing a procedural mechanism that mediates between the different interests 
that come into play in genetic research. 
 
3.2 Unresolved issues 
 
If the charitable trust model provides the advantages described in the paragraph 
above, it also fails to solve many controversial issues that biobank raise and its 
implementation may be practically problematic.  In particular, the charitable trust 
model fails to address controversial issues relating to the ownership of the genetic 
database and its data and its samples, the right of withdrawal, third-party access, and 
funding.  In the remains of the paper, I illustrate my critique of the model by 
analyzing issues from these four controversial areas.  The conclusion I draw from my 
analysis is that, although the charitable trust provides an interesting governance 
model, many of the controversial issues are left open and can only be resolved at the 
level of the rules that are governing the trust. 
 
3.2.1. Ownership of samples 
 
The charitable trust model fails to fully address the ownership issue that genetic 
databases raise.  In today’s debate, thinking of a database in terms of ownership is 
inescapable.  In fact, policymakers and courts have thoroughly discussed the donation 
of human body parts from a property perspective.  The charitable trust model partially 
addresses the issues, because—as ordinarily happen with trusts—the ownership of the 
samples goes to the trustee.  In fact, under the trust agreement, participants formally 
express their wish to transfer his or her interest in the tissue to the trust.  However, 
many important questions concerning the ownership of the tissue samples, the derived 
data, and the database in itself are unanswered. 
 
First of all, Winickoff & Winickoff’s model assigns the samples’ property to the trust, 
thus contemplating that owning human material is legally admissible.  However, the 
ethical admissibility of property in the body is controversial.  Moreover, from a legal 
standpoint, “[b]oth the common law and the views of many developing countries’ 
people agree that there is no such thing as property in the body.”8  As a consequence, 
the charitable trust model might not be compatible with many legal systems to the 
extent that it requires a formal recognition of property in the body.  Alternatively, in 
order to avoid the intricate question of whether donated tissue becomes the property 
of the recipient or the participant in biomedical research, commentators and 
policymakers have proposed the less drastic arrangement of “custodianship” or 
“stewardship.”  For instance, the 2005 Draft of the UK BioBank “Policy and 
Intellectual Property and Access” provides that “UK Biobank Limited [is] the steward 
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of [samples and data]”.9  On the other hand, even this second model leaves open 
many important questions that are intimately connected with the storage and use of 
human tissue.  In fact, being the steward or the custodian of samples assigns you the 
right to court of law to seek the restitution of stolen samples or the right to pass them 
out under certain circumstances—all “traditional incidents of property.”10  In the end, 
the question that first needs to be addressed is whether a formal recognition of 
property in the body is the best way to reason about collections of human tissue.  To 
put it in Alexandra George’s words: When dealing with banking of human tissues, 
“[i]s ‘property’ necessary?”11
 
The model based on ownership to the trust is also in conflict with those policies that 
provide that the donation of a tissue sample does not transfer its property to the 
recipient.  Thus the Icelandic Act on Biobanks explicitly provides that the biobanker 
is not to be considered the owner of the biological samples that are donated to the 
bank.12  Moreover, the non-binding WHO Regional Office report on genetic 
databases provides that participants in biomedical research should have the “primary 
control [of] samples or the information generated from them”, and that their legal 
interest “is akin to a property right” (emphasis added).13  
 
3.2.2 Right of withdrawal: How to implement it? 
 
The controversial aspects of property and biobanks do not end by qualifying the 
biobanker as trustee of the donated samples.  Although the trust as proposed by 
Winickoff & Winickoff becomes formally the owner of the donated tissue, the 
availability of the right of withdrawal challenges the notion that donors are giving up 
their property interests in the sample. Winickoff & Winickoff propose that donors 
shall have an “absolute right” to withdraw the permission to use the samples.14  First 
of all, Winickoff & Winickoff seems to propose a form of revocable trust—a trust that 
may be changed or cancelled by its settler/donor or by another person— with an 
unusual twist:  the settler/donor is also a member of the beneficiary group (the public).  
However, technically it is not a “revocable” trust because, in this case, the withdrawal 
of biological material of a single settler/donor does not revoke the whole trust. This 
ambiguity, which derives from the double hat of grantors and beneficiaries that donors 
wear, may in fact create conflicts between the interest of the participant as a donor 
and the interest of the participant as a beneficiary. In fact, if a participant exercises 
his/her right of withdrawal, the charitable trust has to comply even if the withdrawal is 
against the “interest of the general public”—the genetic make-up of the withdrawing 
participant could be unusually interesting to researchers. As a consequence, Winickoff 
& Winickoff’s model leaves open several questions: may the trustee refuse to comply 
with the request for withdrawal if against the interest of the beneficiaries, thus 
including the withdrawing participant in the category? What if, after the participant 
dies, the request comes from a participants’ family member or his/her legal 
representative? Therefore, the property-based model, in which the general public acts 
as the beneficiary, is somehow in contrast with the idea of granting an absolute right 
of withdrawal to participants. 
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Second, the model does not address the issue of what is the best mechanism to 
implement the withdrawal of samples and data.  The policy options offered by the 
available policies are several: withdrawal could substantiate in returning samples to 
the participants, in destroying the samples, in destroying the link between the identity 
of the donor and the sample (anonymization), in removing the identifying information 
from the database, in destroying the genetic data derived from the sample, or in “no 
longer” using them.15  However, the charitable trust in itself cannot answer the 
question of which mechanism is ethically permissible and better protects the interest 




Winickoff & Winickoff propose the charitable trust model as sharing information and 
favoring an open-access model.16  Indeed, wide access is arguably the best avenue to 
realize the potentialities of a genetic database.  However, the charitable trust model in 
itself does not answer some questions that access implies.  First, the framework does 
not address the issue of whether external research groups may access the samples—by 
having the samples shipped to their labs—or simply the genetic data that have been 
derived by processing the samples.  Second, the charitable trust does not answer the 
question of who may access the samples and whether the public interest that the trust 
serves implies some prioritization mechanism.  Winickoff & Winickoff suggest that 
commercial companies may have access to the database.17  However, the model does 
not solve the problem of whether commercial entities that access the databases become 
owners of the data that are derived from the access, or even may retain (and own) the 
specimen to whom the trust has granted access.  Furthermore, the charitable trust model 
fails to address the issue of whether donors, health care providers and family doctors 
may access the database. Shall participants be only given information about the 
aggregate results of genetic research undertaken using the donated samples or shall they 
be individually informed if the research findings affect their future care?  Finally the 
model does not solve the issue of whether external researchers and private corporations 
may access sensitive data that have been collected along with the samples. 
 
Arguably, if broad access is granted, benefits for the “general public” will be greater. 
However, the notion of “general public” as beneficiary is too vague to provide 
practical guidelines without further specifications.  One can argue that providing 
genetic counselling to the participants is serving the “general public.”  At the same 
time, one can argue that granting exclusive access to one pharmaceutical company is 
the best way to serve the “general public.”  In the end, the trustees will be asked to 
make these sorts of judgements in adopting the policies that regulate third-party 
access.  Most of the answers will only lie in those rules governing the biobank and its 
contractual relations with external actors rather than in the governance framework. 
 
The 2005 Draft of the UK BioBank “Policy and Intellectual Property and Access” 
provides a clear illustration that a governance framework in itself does not address the 
most pressing issues that biobanking activities raise.18  In fact, although the UK 
BioBank has a well-defined governance structure based on the principles of 
stewardship of the samples, open-access of data and serving the public interest, the 
overall framework leaves unresolved many issues that must be addressed by specific 
rules.  In particular, the 2005 Draft regulates a wide variety of issues such as 
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intellectual property rights, the access to human material and data, the re-contacting of 
participants, the terms of access, and the dissemination of research results. 
 
Finally, Winickoff & Winickoff argue that the charitable trust model is the best way 
to ensure that the scientific value of the collected samples is maximized.19  It follows 
that commercial entities would be less willing to maximize the potentialities of the 
samples, if in charge of the same collection.  With its governance structure, the 
charitable trust model is arguably able to retain the sort of identifiers that are usually 
stripped in the commercial context—in fact, at least the United States, commercial 
companies have tighter restraints that non-profit entities performing medical 
research.20  Therefore, maintaining the longitudinal and epidemiological component 
of the genomics cohort study would be enabled and facilitated, which would 
consequently lead to maximizing the “scientific value” of the collection.  However, 
one could argue that accountability to the shareholders provides stronger incentives to 
the managing board than accountability to the “general public” and that corporate law 
requires the disclosure of enough information to ensure public oversight of the 
operations of the company.  Because of the differences in the legal regimes of 
commercial companies and of non-profit companies, one can argue that the charitable 
trust model is superior. However, this argument opens the door for debating whether 
the legal disadvantages of commercial corporations are reasonable. Also, the 
argument is based on an empirical claim that ought to be demonstrated before 
accounting maximization of scientific value among the benefits of the charitable trust 
model. In my opinion, the empirical claim ought to be demonstrated and the policy 
merits of different regimes for different actors ought to debated before accounting 




The key benefit of the charitable trust is that the collection serves the “general 
public.”  An ideal corollary to this premise is that public money entirely funds the 
trust.  However, a charitable trust is likely to need some private funding to reach its 
goals.  It follows that charitable trusts are likely to transact with per-profit companies, 
for instance by paying a fee-based access.  In a stronger scenario, charitable trusts 
would also have to form partnerships with per-profit companies that operate in the 
market.  At least that is what Winickoff & Winickoff envision:  “biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies that want tissue bank or data . . . could be partners with the 
tissue bank in order to help fund it.”21 However, in the end, the Winickoff & 
Winickoff model insufficiently details how it could balance openness and public-




The charitable trust model provides an interesting governance model that is fertile of 
practical applications.  It certainly offers a procedural mechanism to mediate the 
different interests that come into play, and to balance them.  However, many of the 
issues can only be solved at level of rules that govern the trust—or more generally any 
biobank, whether public or private.  Thus the charitable trust model does not fully 
solve issues of ownership of the samples—especially if combined with an absolute 
right of withdrawal—of access to the samples and the data, and of the residual role of 
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commercial entities in population genetics.  Further theoretical and empirical analysis 
of the permissible actions that biobankers can take with regard to the collections that 
they manage is needed to develop the intellectual capacity that is necessary to cope 
with the pressing challenges of genetic databases. 
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